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G. V. CLUM.

THE RELATIONS OF VERMONT TO ENGLAND  
DURING THE REVOLUTION.

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THE RELATIONS OF VERMONT TO ENGLAND DURING THE REVOLUTION

BY

GEORGE VICTOR CLUM

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of  
MASTER OF ARTS

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

1905



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## Chapter I.

"The state of Vermont as an independent commonwealth, struggled into existence through a double revolution. The early inhabitants of the state revolted against the province of New York, to which the territory had been annexed by the arbitrary will of the king, and they united with their brethren of the other colonies in their armed resistance to the demands of the mother country".<sup>1</sup> These revolutions were spontaneous and of the latter script, and worked together to place Vermont in the sisterhood of the states.

To obtain her independence and gain her and Vermont's case heard charged by her enemies with practices either treasonable or verging on treason mixed with duplicity in her relations with Great Britain during the latter part of the Revolutionary War.

In order to obtain a thorough understanding of the state of affairs and the causes which led Vermont to play the part she did, we must go back to the early settlement of that region.

In the year 1621 John Mason, a London merchant, issued a will, directed, provided a tract of land from the town of Newbury, in the vicinity of the Merrimack River. After making payment was granted permission to bring back to the New England and Canada and to

1. H. Hall, p.1.



about 60 miles west. This tract was called New Hampshire, and in a later period, New York claimed that her territory extended also to this 60 mile line.

In 1641, after many difficulties the boundary was set with Massachusetts, the line lasting until 1679, when Massachusetts was informed by the Secretary of State of the King's intention to separate New Hampshire from that government and required her to revoke all her commissions which had been issued there.<sup>1</sup>

She was required to do so by 1685, and did not again have her independence as a colony, until 1776. The civil line between the two colonies was not at this time definitely established, and occasioned much ill feeling.

This controversy was decided in 1740, by the King in Council "that the northern boundary of the province of New Hampshire should be the same line, running the course of the Merrimac river, at their miles' distance on the north side thereof, beginning at the Atlantic Ocean and ending at a point due north of Pentucket falls; and a straight line drawn from thence due west till it meets with His Majesty's other government".<sup>2</sup>

This established the line which separates the colonies of New Hampshire and New York, and which is due to the claims of New Hampshire.

1. *Pelham, v. 4, p. 212.* *411, v. 1, p. 40.*

2. *ibid.*, *412, v. 2, p. 38.*



for the time being. It was understood that their jurisdiction extended as far <sup>west</sup> as that river Connecticut had cleared west of the built fort Orange in 1721; that is, to a line 20 miles east of Hudson river.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly on the third of January, 1749, Governor Wentworth of New Hampshire sent a grant of a tract of six miles square, situated twenty miles east of Hudson river, called "Albion". This was unknown to New York. Having received information applying <sup>partly</sup> to other grants in that vicinity, Governor Wentworth wrote to Governor Clinton of New York <sup>partly</sup> asking for the boundaries of New York and staking the limits that had been determined by the surveyor in settling the boundaries between New Hampshire and New Hampshire.<sup>2</sup>

Governor Clinton replied that they extended as far east to the Connecticut river, and gave to his authority the letters patent of Charles II to the Duke of York "All the lands from the west side of the Connecticut river to the east side of Hudson river". Governor Wentworth asked on what authority the Connecticut and other colonies governments claimed so far westward, and was informed that the line was agreed to by Connecticut, 1684, and confirmed by King William, and the boundary survey, 1726. "Upon which the first objection was easily removed, and then through the neglect of New York. The opinion of Governor Clinton

1. *Ellis of New H., Vol. II, pp. 12-13.*

2. *State p. 10. For first of T. V. Vol. IV, p. 522.*



5.  
were not in accordance with the boundaries of New York as given by Mr. Colden, Surveyor General 1738 to the Board of Trade. In viewing the eastern boundary he says: "From the east end of Ossipee Lake, continue westerly along the borders of Canada to the colony of Massachusetts Bay and of the colony of Connecticut, to the river between Fort Island and the main".<sup>1</sup>

At this point 20 miles east of theudson was recommended by the Board of Trade for the Massachusetts boundary 1767, and accepted 1773.

Governor Wentworth continued to make grants in the disputed section until the French and Indian war broke out. During this war the New England troops cut a road from Charlestown, New Hampshire to the shore opposite Deer Point, the fertility of the lands became known and at the close of the war they were increasingly sought after by speculators, gamblers, and settlers.<sup>2</sup>

The lands were surveyed and laid out in townships by Governor Wentworth and in a few years the grants covered the territory to within what was thought 20 miles east of Hudson river. The country was quickly settled and prosperous.

New York objected to these actions on the part of New Hampshire and issued a proclamation December, 1768, asserting

.....  
1. Hall: *Report*, p.66-

2. *Will. & Vol. II*, p.13. Hall: *Report*, p.333.



her claim to the land east of the Connecticut river.<sup>1</sup> This was answered by Governor Hutchinson in a counter proclamation March, 1766.<sup>2</sup> Lieutenant Governor Holden of New York in 1766 made application to the Board of Trade representing that it would be much more convenient and advantageous for the people west of the Connecticut river to be subject to New York<sup>3</sup> of commerce and better market. His affidavit to the Crown is as follows here, and is startling in its boldness. Many soldiers were making applications, and there was not sufficient for them except in tick areas, and they would not be under New Hampshire government.<sup>4</sup>

His Majesty decided the question in favor of New York, July, 1769, but made no reference to any previous grant.

The reasons<sup>5</sup> for granting the application are well given by Willard Hall in an address before the New York Historical Society December 4, 1860; also in the Proceedings of the New York Historical Society October, 1893. The proprietors of New York, not content with the award of territorial jurisdiction, proceeded to assert the right of property in the soil, and therefore all their grants and patents are void. Orders were issued to the

1. *Doc. Hist. of N.Y.* Vol. IV, p. 346.

2. *Willard: IV*, p. 13.

3. *Col. Hist. of State of N.Y.* Vol. I, p. 202.

4. *State: p. 36.* *Doc. Hist. of N.Y.* Vol. I, p. 361.

5. *Doc. Hist. of Col. Hist. of N.Y.* Vol. I, p. 366.



out their grants within bars would not if not it was to be surveyed and sold.<sup>1</sup> In this New York acted unwise and unjustly. There is evidence to the fact that the settlers could have become quiet loyal subjects of New York, enough there was some objections to bring this to the Court<sup>2</sup> as they termed it, but the serious trouble arose from the interference with basic private rights.<sup>3</sup>

Some of the Indians bound their lands the second time but the greater part estimated ten grants were made for these, and actions for ejectment were commenced in the courts at Albany.

These acts of injustice converted the people into rebels who deserved and defiant. A new and powerful opposition to the claims of New York was created.

Especially was this the case on the west side of the Great Mountains where from the proximity to New York they have more frequently evicted from their lands by adverse claimants from New York.

Most of the resistance and particularly in the Chenango County of the Susquehanna valley the power of New York was so little felt that the transfer occasioned no more active hostility than arose from sympathy and a general spirit of resistance to

1. Lansing's Schuyler, vol. I, p.201.

See Hist. A. & W. IV, p.268. Willits: 17-18

2. Willister: History of Pen. 186, p.117.

3. Schuyler. Willister. Allen.



Oppression, everywhere rife at that time. The people on the west side came principally from New Jersey and Connecticut and were radicals or Separatists in religion and opposed to centralized government and oppression. They were more ardent than those on the east side.<sup>1</sup>

Washington was selected by these radicals and became the center of political influence for the west side and finally for the east.<sup>2</sup> New York had given them the dearest alternative of leaving their possessions to others or oppressing them. It was full of the spirit of true English liberty owing down to their original New England ancestors they could not submit to this alternative. New York's aristocratic reputation, and loyalty to the new government and her system of land grants, were displaced to their Puritan free-born castes.

They were inspired by the same motives to resist the authority of New York that underlay the desire for new states further west. It was adopting the idea of Squatter Sovereignty and natural rights as advocated by many of the leading men of America. Owing to more determined resistance, they used various means to gain their ends.<sup>3</sup>

The authorities of New York tried to use force but the

1. Merlin and Tricote: *History of New York*, p. 24.

2. *ibid.* *Amer. Hist.* vol. VIII.

3. Turner: *Amer. Hist. Rev.* 1890-5, p. 77. p. 267.



militia seeing that it was for the benefit of the speculators could not take active part, in the face of armed opposition, so the sheriff was helpless.

The settlers took courage from this, believing that the sentiment of the people of the adjacent states was in their favor. They became more determined and daring and did not permit any evictions to be carried out.

The controversy became so clamorous and spirited that the settlers on the west side held a convention and sent agents to England to implore protection of the crown.<sup>1</sup> In 1737 the New York government was ordered to cease making grants in that country until the pleasure of the king shall be known.<sup>2</sup>

The settlers' ropes rose, but they were doomed to disappointment for the New York authorities did not obey instructions. The business of law & new grants was too lucrative. There was only one course left open to the settlers. The government of New York refused to obey the king's orders. Therefore, these brave, determined men took the law in their own hands, and an effective opposition to all rule of New York arose. Riots, riots, and violence to New York officials ensued.<sup>3</sup>

Governor Calder offered to certify their grants at half price, a time in which to pay it, but governor.....

1. Also p.342. Miller's II, p.23.

2. See Hist. of N.Y. 1731-375. Hist. of State of N.Y. 1751-71, 312. 1751-20, 231. Col. Hist. of State of N.Y. 1751-187.

3. 1751-71, 312. 1751-20, 231. Col. Hist. of State of N.Y. 1751-187.



"core come out charged the full fee and thus embittered the people still more. At this time <sup>try</sup> also favored the letter plan in a letter to the Earl of Hillsborough October 7, 1777 to apply to certain townships in particular.<sup>1</sup> The Governor of New York then tried to separate the people of the east from the west side by lowering the fee and granting positions to some of the leading persons.<sup>2</sup>

Allen also secured copies of the royal instructions and went to New York to get relief.<sup>3</sup> He failed in his efforts and thus established a precedent to destroy all titles of land held under the New Hampshire grants because the judge refused to admit as evidence the royal instructions to Hartworth or the settlers themselves. Mr. Kemp, the King's Attorney and a New York land speculator due to join Allen "that the people settled on the New Hampshire grants should be advised to make the best terms possible with their landlords, for right often prevailed against right."<sup>4</sup> Allen claims Kemp tried to bribe him. Both held inverse beliefs in the New Hampshire grants.

The settlers now joined revolution to support their rights and property by force believing that the colonists were

.....  
1. Col. Hist. of State of N.Y. vol. VIII, p.313.

2. Allen p.512.

3. Col. of N.Y. Land Papers, p.673.

4. Specks: n. Allen, vol. I.



with the Governor and council of New York and land speculators.<sup>1</sup>

.....  
1. See Allen: p.392.



## Chapter II.

The scallers now formed themselves into a military association with others often as Colonel<sup>1</sup> and took the name of the Green Mountain Boys. Their opposition was systematic, severe and effective against all New York officials.

Frequent reports and complaints were made against them and large rewards were made for the six leaders. The Green Mountain Boys now passed a decree, 1770, forbidding all persons taking grants, or the confirmation of grants under the Government of New York.<sup>2</sup>

The rulers of New York had been very busy making these grants and especially so from 1769-71.<sup>3</sup>

Whitcomb Governor Golden granted patents for 600,000 acres, receiving about \$25,000. In seven months he issued patents for 166,000 acres in Vermont. Governor Moore patented 144,620 acres, receiving \$4,512.00 as his share. Governor Currie in eight months granted 450,000 acres of Vermont land to speculators and 61,000 acres to himself. This was done by fraud.

Governor Brown granted 542,410 acres and \$2,000 to himself. The total granted by these men was 2,169,610 for which

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1. See Miller, *Illusions*. At *Albion*: *Hist. of Vermont*.

2. *Albion*, p. 346. *Albion*.

3. *Albion*, *Hist. Coll.* vol. I, 123. *Albion*, 16-.

*Albion*, *Coll. of Land Papers*, *N.Y.*

*Albion*, *Coll. of N.Y.* *Albion*.



the fees were \$66,112.74. 1,300,000 acres were granted after the king's Order in Council 1767 mostly in large tracts. In 1772 the Vermont settlers sent agents to England and orders were sent to stop granting land,<sup>1</sup> and started the government and Council of New York with irregular conduct. The government of New York 1774 passed an act as most despotic that had ever appeared in the British colonies, ordering all offenders to surrender themselves within 70 days and if not, they were to be convicted of felony with the punishment of death.<sup>2</sup> All the crimes committed on the grants were by this act subject to be tried in the county and by the courts at Albany. It involved loss of time and money and placed a great disadvantage in securing justice, as they did not have friends near and were tried by hostile juries and prejudiced judges. The settlers issued a counter remonstrance reciting the justice of their cause, declaring they would preserve their property, defend their lives, according to an order and submissive if New York will remove their patents to the New Hampshire charters and quit the settlers in their possessions and suspend the criminal prosecution against them.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Col. Hist. of N.Y. Vol. VIII, p.317-18.

2. Willises: 22. Allen: 853.

3. Slave: Vt. State Papers, p.49.



They then advised all persons that "We are resolved to inflict immediate death on whosoever may attempt to apprehend them".<sup>1</sup>

The controversy between the colonies and England had assumed such a crisis, that there was a general suspension of royal authority in the colonies and the courts of justice were either closed or adjourned or prevented from meeting. An attempt was made to hold the court at Westminster, March 13, 1775. Some of the people occupied the courthouse and prevented the officers from entering. About 11 o'clock P.M. the sheriff and officers again tried to gain admission and being refused, fired into the house killing one man and wounding others. The following day part of the officers were captured, but were later released.

Thoroughly aroused now, a large body of the people met at Westminster, April 11, 1774; among other resolves, they came to the following resolves: "that it is the duty of the inhabitants, wholly to renounce and resist the administration of the government of New York until such time as the lives and property of the inhabitants may be secured it".<sup>2</sup> The battle of Lexington put an end to this controversy before open hostilities between the two factions arose. A train of causes and circumstances now came on which finally led to the independence of Vermont. New

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1. Slader: 54. Williams: II, 27.

2. Slader: 60. Williams: II, 28. I. Allen.



York was engaged in large affairs, while the settlers improved the opportunity in perfecting their union and organization and settled down to a deliberate decided hostility to the claims of New York.

Their exposed frontier caused them to organize for their own protection, and the exploits of their leaders in the early part of the war brought them into prominence before the colonies, and made them feel their own importance. They were loyal to the colonies but were unwilling to be enrolled in the service of New York. <sup>1</sup> January 17, 1776 they petitioned Congress to permit them to do service as inhabitants of the New Hampshire grants and not as inhabitants of New York province or be subject to said province. <sup>1</sup> Congress advised them to submit to New York for the time being, but that this action would not be construed to affirm that New York had jurisdiction over that country.

The settlers on the grants not being organized under the crown, yet having decisions favorable to them, saw the necessity of having a regular system of government. There was no superior power to decide the controversy at this time and it left the settlers the opportunity of declaring themselves independent.<sup>2</sup> In the fall of 1775 several of the leading men had gone to Philadelphia and asked the advice of Congress.<sup>3</sup> They were not for - - - - -  
 1. Slade: 64.  
 2. Slade: 65.  
 3. Thompson: 49.



received, yet on their return they heard the news that some of the leading men of Congress urged them to organize and form a temporary association. Circular letters were addressed to the different towns, and delegates were appointed who should meet at Dorset, July 24, 1776.<sup>1</sup> 51 members representing 35 towns were present. They forwarded a petition to Congress giving an account of their controversy, and stating their unswerving loyalty to the cause of the colonies and their willingness to bear their share of the burden of the war. They formed an association and adjourned to meet again September 2d, when they resolved without a dissenting vote "to take suitable measures as soon as may be, to declare the New Hampshire grants a free and separate district".<sup>2</sup>

January 15, 1777 the convention again met, at Westminister, and adopted the resolution declaring the New Hampshire grants a free and independent state, with the name of New Connecticut (alias Vermont), and drew up a declaration<sup>3</sup> and petition to Congress stating their resolutions of independence<sup>3</sup>, and claiming the right to govern themselves in such manner as they .....

1. Gov. and Council of Vt. 1, 15-36.

2. Slade; 67. Williams: 168. Dunlop: New York, II, 93.  
Cal. of N.Y. Dist. Ass. Vol. II, 133.

3. Gov. and Council, 18, 51.

Kingsford: VII, 75.

Williams: II, 169.



in their wisdom should choose, not repugnant to any resolves of the Continental Congress; that they were at all times ready in conjunction with their brethren in the United States to contribute their full proportion towards maintaining the present just war against the fleets and armies of Great Britain. They asked to be received among the free and independent American states and that their delegates be admitted to seats in Congress.

No time could have been more propitious. They were under no jurisdiction, and every part of the United States was at that period contending against oppression, and every consideration that could justify the proceedings of Congress, was a reason why the people of Vermont should take that opportunity to effectually guard against their former sufferings. The neighboring states were willing, except of course New York. She protested to Congress expressing her indignation at these proceedings; charged certain influential persons with fostering the revolt; and demanded the withdrawal of the Continental Commission, Colonel Warner, and other officers. She claimed that many were deserting the Vermont cause. In March 1777 the government of Vermont sent another application to Congress claiming that the spirit of defection from Vermont was not very widespread.<sup>1</sup>

The controversy was now an object of general attention. In April, 1777, Dr. Thomas Young of Philadelphia sent a printed

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1. Allen: 381.



letter<sup>1</sup> to Vermont representing that it was the opinion of several of the leading members of Congress that Vermont should proceed to organize, form a constitution, and appoint delegates to Congress. He enclosed the resolutions of Congress of May 15, 1776, which contained these words: "that it be recommended to the respective assemblies and conventions of the United Colonies where no government sufficient to the exigencies of their affairs has hitherto been established, to adopt such government as shall, in the opinion of the representatives of the people, best conduce to the happiness and safety of their constituents in particular and America in general." New York protested<sup>2</sup> May, 1777 to Congress and was informed that the petition of the agents of Vermont should be dismissed<sup>3</sup> and that the freedom of the people of the New Hampshire grants should not be countenanced.

The convention of Vermont met July 2, 1777 to consider the draft of a constitution, which was done<sup>4</sup>, but owing to the news from Ticonderoga, a council of safety<sup>5</sup> was appointed to act, and the convention adjourned. The Council of Safety provided for raising militia and maintaining them by confiscating the property

.....  
1. Gov. and Council, Vol. I, 394-7.

2. Doc. Hist. of N.Y. IV, 555.

3. Doc. Hist. of N.Y. IV, 568.

4. Williams: II, 177. Ira Allen: 383.

5. Gov. and Council, I, 67-.



of those who should join Great Britain.<sup>1</sup> Vermont was now recognized by New Hampshire as an independent state, but not so by General Schuyler.

The constitution was revised December 24, 1777 and the first Tuesday in March 1778 named as election day.<sup>2</sup> In order to check the movement some, February 21, 1778 Governor Clinton issued a proclamation<sup>3</sup> promising to confirm New Hampshire grant titles in particular cases and making some favorable concessions, yet expressly declaring that that government "will vigorously maintain its rightful supremacy over the persons and property of those disaffected subjects".

Vermont counteracted this move of New York by making their government popular, in doing away with taxes. This was done by raising sufficient revenue from the sale of confiscated property of Tories, and of ungranted lands. Settlers flocked to the grants from Connecticut especially, and the newcomers were staunch friends of the Vermont government.

.....  
1. Gov. and Council, I, 108-130-. Gov. and Council, I, 133.

2. I. Allen: 391-. Gov. and Council, I, '76-.

Slade: 241.

3. Doc. Hist. of N.Y. IV, 573.



Vermont's Controversy with New Hampshire.

Vermont was increasing in strength, power, and favor, but this caused unintentionally a dispute with New Hampshire which produced considerable agitation with that state and brought the question more forcibly to the attention of Congress. Many of the inhabitants west of the 60 mile limit of the original royal grant desired to cast in their lot with the Vermont people. They claimed that the Revolution had destroyed the force of the royal grants to New Hampshire and left them free to form a separate government, or unite with some other.<sup>1</sup>

March 12, 1778 a petition was received from 16 towns east of the Connecticut river asking to be admitted into its union. The petition was voted on by the people and was carried. The 16 towns then notified the government of New Hampshire.<sup>2</sup>

Governor Trebeck of New Hampshire protested to Governor Chittenden of Vermont, setting forth New Hampshire's claims, and also to Congress, urging them to take action.

Vermont sent G. Allen to Congress to ascertain how their proceedings were viewed there. He reported<sup>3</sup> that in his belief Congress was unanimously opposed and that it would use its power

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1. Drury: Vol. II, 216. Mass. Hist. Soc. 462-3.

2. Belknap, N.H. II, 333-15. Slatie: 69. Allen: 329.

3. Calendar of N.Y. Ass. Vol. I, 154.

4. Slatie: 93.



to annihilate the state of Vermont unless the towns were given back to New Hampshire. In October, the Assembly of Vermont met and the representatives of ten of the sixteen towns took their seats. It was voted 23 to 28<sup>not</sup> to erect a new county nor to include them in the county of Cumberland. The leaders<sup>1</sup> withdrew and at a meeting held at Cornish, New Hampshire, October 9, 1777, proposed to unite the New Hampshire grants and New Hampshire into one state.

The people<sup>2</sup> of Vermont made haste to dissolve their union with the sixteen towns.

New Hampshire now laid claim to all the grants of Vermont.<sup>3</sup> The situation was critical. Three states were claiming a part or all of her territory -- Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New York, for Massachusetts had in a claim for the southern part without regard to the settlement of 1710.<sup>4</sup> She claimed all the land west of the Connecticut given to the New York boundary in so far as it was desirous by the king of Great Britain in 1732. Some of the residents of Cumberland County asked<sup>5</sup> help of New York and when it was sent, Ethan Allen with an armed force captured the officers.

Congress<sup>6</sup> June 18, 1779 advised that they be liberate the

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1. Gov. and Council, Vol. I, 420-25, 29.
2. Vt. Hist. Coll. I, 294-.
3. Gov. and Council, Vol. I, 435.
4. Gov. and Council, Vol. II, p.126.
5. Gov. Hist. of N.Y. IV, 50.
6. Journal of Cong. 1779, 259-60.



and appointed a committee to go to Vermont and investigate. On September 24, 1779 Congress resolved that the three states ought to support executing their laws over the district except over those claiming allegiance, and also, for those denying the jurisdiction over the others. This last clause was repealed in October, 1779 on account of the protests of Governor Clinton of New York. New York and New Hampshire passed acts in compliance with the wishes of Congress but Massachusetts persisted in her claim very likely for the welfare and independence of Vermont. As it was impossible for four separate jurisdictions to exist in one locality, the people of Vermont were forced to take decided action. The governor and council December 10, 1779 published an appeal declaring that they were not bound to submit to the execution of a plan they believed to be countenanced by neighboring states, nor to allow Congress to interfere with the internal police and government of Vermont, they were not represented and could not submit to the resolutions. They were ready to bear their share of the burden of the war from its first commencement, if admitted into the union. Congress took no action until June 3, 1780, when they resolved that the acts of the people of the New Hampshire grants were unacceptable, and injurious to the peace and welfare of the United States, and promised to take up the subject in September.

.....

L. Wells: See Addn., Vol. III, p.144.



Governor Clinton replied to the President of Congress July 25, 1780 concerning the resolutions of Congress, that they were injurious to the natural rights which they have to liberty and independence as well as inconsistent with the principles on which Congress founded their own right to independence. He called attention to Vermont's rights which had been set forth in many pamphlets, and the denial contained in them that Congress had authority over that state, so far as relates to their existence as a free and independent government. Congress has claimed the authority to judge of the jurisdiction. Vermont has, therefore, no alternative: they must either submit to the unmeritable decree of Congress or continue their appeal to heaven and <sup>to</sup> arms.

Vermont expected Congress to assist them against the unfeared colonies of New Hampshire and Massachusetts Bay but they have been disappointed. Vermont has had the only protection to the frontiers in that quarter, and has prevented the ravaging of their own and the other states by the enemy.

They are in a condition to maintain their government with the protection of disinterested friends. If this should fail them, and it is likely to fail them, they were at liberty to offer or accept arms of salvation or consolations which their friends offer. There is no motive for me to assist our states only to lose her own independence. Vermont deals severely with the Tories, and confis-

.....

1. Gov. and Council, Vol. II, 156-7.



ected their property and has used the money obtained from the sale of unappropriated lands for the defense of her honored confederate. She has taken an active part in the war with Gen. S. Brainerd in the expectation of securing her liberties. The Legislature of Massachusetts may lawfully claim to the territory of Vermont as a body, nor authorized Congress to take cognizance of her claim. New Hampshire has judicially authorized Congress to make adjudication of this late claim. Her claim is illegal, absurd, and inconsistent as can be shown by free discussions. New York is thus the only competitor.

This document from a principle of virtue and above attachment to the cause of liberty, offices union with the United States of America. If this be denied by Congress, Vermont will propose this state to the authorities of the United States separately and take such measures as self-preservation may justify.

Governor Bentwich thus shows that her loyalty could not be questioned, and that she was incalled by motives similar to those of the other colonies,

Vermont sent two representatives to assist the delegates of Virginia. (After several delays and protracted negotiations with the delegates of New York together 2) the close of Vermont's session 27, 1780 had obtained further consideration.

The representatives of Vermont were not treated as friends of the states, to advise, but to be used to Congress and its decisions. They were willing to have the trouble settled in several



wars, but Vermont was a party, said if we could appeal to God and the world.

Congress was afraid to settle the difficulty for it was generally believed that the legitimate title of Vermont would give them with Great Britain rather than affinity to the Government of New York.

While the movement of 1773 for the union of the sixteen towns was not successful, it was not abandoned. The inhabitants of those towns still longed for union with Vermont, this Vermont at this time had an opportunity to increase her strength and influence and play the same game as the opponents,

Many of the people of northern New Hampshire were desirous of being annexed to Vermont; others wished to unite Vermont to New Hampshire. At a convention held at Manchester January 16, 1781 to decide the question, the majority voted to unite with Vermont and appointed a committee to confer with that government. On February 10 this committee made an application for union.<sup>1</sup> About the same time a petition was received from the people of the northernmost part of New York asking for admission. By June 16, 1781, these unions were perfected and Vermont claimed jurisdiction from the original limits of New Hampshire to the Salmon River. These actions so complicated were to sustain the independence than any she had yet tried.

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1. *State: State Papers*, p.133.



She had gained confidence in herself and her beliefs, increased her strength, enlisted her forces, and enlarged her area and population, and also influenced Congress and the states. This influence also extended in a degree direction and ultimately led to success.

While Waerent was importuning Congress for a settlement of the question of statehood, and increasing her strength by the East and West Unions, she was also protecting herself from an enemy in another quarter, and it is now our propose to relate how these and preceding events gave her that opportunity.



## CHAPTER III

NEGOTIATIONS WITH CANADA

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The generals and ministers of England were not slow to take advantage of any means by which they could weaken the common enemy, and it was their policy, after the failure of Burgoyne's campaign of 1777, to conciliate the colonists wherever it was possible.

General Burgoyne had issued a proclamation July 4th, 1777, promising security to all who would assist him, or provide food for his army, nor hinder his march by destroying the bridges, and who should in no way help the American army.<sup>1</sup> He thought the promise of security, and freedom from the horrors of war would cause many of the people to become loyal to Britain, from self-interest, if from no other cause. Learning of the contest of Vermont for independence and the bitter feeling which existed between Vermont and New York, England took the first opportunity to negotiate with Vermont

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<sup>1</sup>Vermont Historical Collections, I:163, 164.



concerning a reunion with Canada. Lord Germaine wrote to Clinton, March 3rd, 1778, that steps were to be taken towards reconciliation with Vermont.

As early as December 12th, 1778, Mr. Elliott wrote to Lord Carlisle, in reference to Governor Clinton's address to the New York Assembly: "Governor Ethan Allen and his new province are resolved to come to no terms, but to support their own independence. Governor Clinton of New York is resolved to make him submit. Connecticut and New Hampshire will aid Allen as they want land and will aid Vermont against Congress."<sup>1</sup> Chief Justice Smith of New York wrote to Carlisle, December 12th, 1778; "Mr. Tryon's plans for restoring peace in Vermont was by compensating the New Hampshire claimants for their actual possessions, out of the other waste lands of the Crown, with a suspension of the payment of quit-rents on the new grants for a long time. The trouble could have been composed at little expense. He suggested a council of police with general, but very full, powers to settle such disputes and work upon the interest."

General Henry Clinton wrote to William Eden, "Ethan Allen is a man of infamous character. He may, in my opinion,

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<sup>1</sup> Stevens' MSS, No. 1229, December 14th, 1778.  
Historical MSS. Commission. 15th Report, V:391.



be easily tempted to throw off any dependence on the tyranny of Congress and made useful to our government by giving him and his adherents the property of all land appropriated to the rebels and making that country a separate government, dependent on the Crown and laws of Great Britain. This would draw others from the rebels and thus weaken them." <sup>1</sup>

On December 26th, Chief Justice Smith wrote:<sup>2</sup> "The Militia of New York have had action with Allen." In January and February, 1779, letters of like nature were sent to Carlisle.

On January 19th, 1779, he wrote to Mr. Fanning: "Vermont still maintains her revolt. Governor Clinton favors violence against them but he cannot carry it out. Clinton holds lands in that country under a New York title." <sup>3</sup> Mr. A. Elliott wrote the same to Lord Carlisle. Smith wrote to Carlisle that the revolt of Vermont had thrown the rest of the colonies into consternation.<sup>3</sup> Good use may be made of this subdivision of the factions. If Vermont succeeds, thousand of loyal and disloyal subjects will be ruined. Many well disposed subjects have promoted the present division to embarrass and overturn the Congressional power.

The first definite instructions, relative to the move-

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<sup>1</sup>American MSS., Number 549. December 24th, 1778.

<sup>2</sup>Historical MSS. Commission, V:414.

<sup>3</sup>Stevens' MSS., Number 114.



ment for reunion, were given by Lord Germaine to General Haldimand, April, 1779.<sup>1</sup> He was referred to a copy of a letter to Clinton, which would inform him "of the encouragement he is authorized to hold out to the country they style Vermont to induce them to return to their allegiance," and "it was his Majesty's pleasure that he should endeavor to open a negotiation with them."<sup>2</sup> "Sir Henry Clinton was authorized to erect it into a separate province and to confirm the possessors of land in their titles. What further assurance it may be necessary to hold out to them you must be the best judge." "It is very important to restore them."<sup>3</sup>

March 17th, 1790, Germaine again urged upon Haldimand the vast importance of drawing Vermont over, the means of accomplishing it, and inducements to be offered. In August, he repeated the instructions that it was very essential and, in December, gave specific instructions that Vermont would be a separate province with every prerogative and immunity. Haldimand should act with great caution. Should Vermont reunite, two battalions of ten companies should be raised with promise of half pay, and Allen and Chittenden were to be appointed lieutenant-colonels. Sir Henry Clinton acted upon

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<sup>1</sup> Stevens MSS.

<sup>2</sup> Canadian Archives, 1885, page 276.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 1884.



the advice of Germaine, before General Haldimand had an opportunity to do so, and was in actual correspondence with Ethan Allen within a few months after receiving his instructions. He informed General Haldimand, September 9th, 1779, of his negotiations with Ethan Allen.<sup>1</sup> His messenger had arrived with an answer from Allen to the effect that "he would raise four thousand men, attack the army under Clinton, against the Indians, and that his magazines etcetera were ready." He had recommended Allen to fall back on Canada and coöperate with General Haldimand, or else join him, Clinton, if he thought it expedient, and enroll men and name officers. The rumors seem to confirm the reports of Allen's intention.

This is the first reference I have found of actual negotiations between the two parties. There was an exchange<sup>2</sup> of views between the British leaders up to March, 1780, but no other reference to any between them and the people of Vermont. March 3rd, 1780, Colonel Beverly Robinson, a British officer, addressed a letter to Colonel E. Allen, making overtures towards reunion. The letter stated that the writer had been

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<sup>1</sup>Canadian Archives, 1887, page 541.

<sup>2</sup>Stevens MSS., page 122.

Canadian Archives, 1897:541-550; 1885, page 278.



informed that Colonel Allen and most of the inhabitants of Vermont were opposed to separation from Great Britain, and were establishing an independent state. One of the causes of the continuance of the war was that those who desired an equitable connection with the mother country did not communicate with each other. He thought that two regiments might be placed in Vermont in support of the royal cause. Allen should feel free to communicate; any proposal he should make would be referred to the Commander-in-Chief. If Vermont would take an active part with Great Britain, she would be organized as a separate government. Should the letter not be approved, he hoped no insult would be shown the bearer, and the matter could drop into oblivion. Any friend, bringing a proposition, should be protected and allowed to return.

Allen consulted with the other Vermont leaders and it was thought best to return no answer. There was some correspondence carried on with the British in regard to a cartel for the exchange of prisoners, but the Vermont leaders made this an opening wedge for further action if necessity should demand it. On the 7th of July<sup>1</sup> Ethan Allen wrote to Major Carleton that he had received his letter with the one en-

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<sup>1</sup>Kingsford, William,- History of Canada, VII:77. The Canadian Archives (1888, page 780) says the date was October 29th..



closed from Haldimand to Chittenden. Every respect would be paid to a flag betokening an accredited agent and no hostilities permitted. A similar observance was expected on the part of the British, when a proper person should be sent to arrange for a cartel. The correspondence contains nothing definite until October, 1780. In August, Haldimand answered Sir Henry Clinton's letter of the previous year and told him that no dependence could be placed on the word of Allen or of those associated with him in Vermont, who could not be bound by laws or ties: "If Allen could arm four thousand men it would not be safe to trust him in the province for he might seize it. He is raising a force to defend his country against the King and Congress. Allen has never made any overtures to me." Later he changed his opinion and said that Ethan Allen was expected to be in Canada with six hundred Green Mountain Boys.

Affairs are now to assume a different phase. In the latter part of October, 1780, under instructions from Major Carleton, and with power to treat with those whom he should meet, Captain Justus Sherwood went to Skeneboro and forwarded dispatches to Ethan Allen at Castleton. On October

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<sup>1</sup>Canadian Archives, 1887, page 547.



29th, Sherwood had an interview with Allen.<sup>1</sup> A council of field was summoned to whom Allen explained that he found Sherwood's instructions "somewhat discretionary." Accordingly, he desired a short talk with him before the meeting. Sherwood explained that he had business of importance to communicate, but must ask Allen's word of honor that no advantage should be taken if his propositions were not agreeable. Allen accepted these conditions, provided "it was no damned Arnold plan" to sell his country and his own honor by betraying his trust. Sherwood assured him that it was honorable, and entered upon the business of his mission. He told Allen that, in Haldimand's view, Congress was only duping the people of Vermont and would crush them when there was an opportunity. He gave him Haldimand's proposition, - that Vermont should rejoin Great Britain, and urged him to accept it. Allen protested that no personal considerations would influence him. He had been offered a lieutenant-colonel's commission if he would change sides, but refused. But, as Vermont was dearer to him than life, he would consider the propositions. Allen agreed to keep the proposals secret and the two returned to the council. Arrangements, satisfactory

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<sup>1</sup>Kingsford, William, - History of Canada, VIII:78, 79.



to both sides, were concluded and Sherwood pledged himself that no offensive operations should be undertaken, guaranteeing to inform Carleton through a flag that he had given this pledge.

A circular letter was, accordingly, written to all the commanding officers of Vermont, informing them that a truce had been entered into.<sup>1</sup> The council ended, and Major Fay undertook to deliver Sherwood's despatch. On the following day, Sherwood informed Allen that he had brought secret proposals and that they could be produced. Allen told him to leave them where they were, and when Ira Allen and Major Fay came, he should open the business with them with care, and not tell them of his conversation with Sherwood. Sherwood was to propose nothing to them but neutrality and that to take place when the course had been forced upon them by the tyranny of Congress, and an obstinate refusal on her part to grant Vermont her rights. Sherwood summed up the result of the conference with Allen, - that his attachment to the liberties of America was strong and only treatment such as was being forced upon the Vermont people could lead him to abandon the cause; were he to make a declaration of such inten-

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<sup>1</sup>Kingsford, William, - History of Canada, VII:79.



tion, his people would cut off his head. Vermont could not now defend herself, nor was Haldimand able to send a force sufficient to protect her. Shortly, a manifesto would be published in which Vermont would declare herself a neutral power and, if forced to it, she would call upon Canada for aid. He asked about the same conditions which Haldimand was prepared to grant. Allen assured him that it would require time and, on account of the danger, he recommended that Haldimand's flag should always include some negotiation with New York, as well as with Vermont. It was distinctly stated that should Vermont be recognized as a separate state the negotiations should end.

Owing to a false report of the presence of Major Carleton and a body of troops, Sherwood was arrested, but, by order of Governor Chittenden, was released and started for Canada, November 11th, after arranging with Ira Allen and Major Fay for a cartel. November 4th, Allen wrote to Carleton that he had been informed that hostilities were to cease on the northern frontier of New York.<sup>1</sup> Allen had insisted that the frontiers should extend to the Hudson river. "This is proof of Allen's attachment to the American cause."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Canadian Archives, 1888. page 780.

<sup>2</sup>Dunlop, W.,- History of New York, II:219.



Haldimand was informed by Governor Chittenden, November 6th, that he had laid the letters, relating to a cartel, before the Legislature and Major Fay and Ira Allen were appointed to settle the cartel.

About the same date, Ethan Allen wrote again to Major Carleton, saying that the intelligence received from Sherwood would answer Carleton's letter. He assured him that the cartel would be carried out on honourable terms and with Vermont alone, and requested that the terms of the truce should extend to the frontiers of New York. It would be the last time he should propose anything of the kind to a British officer. Several letters were exchanged between the Vermont leaders and the Canadian authorities in regard to a cartel, between August and December, 1780, but nothing further, in regard to a reunion, was suggested. Sherwood, August 29th, 1780, wrote to General Powel that Ethan Allen was reported to be raising men for the British Government and would aid them if Congress should refuse the claims of Vermont.<sup>1</sup> He proposed a flag of truce, to be sent under the pretense of public business, so that General Haldimand's proposals might be communicated to Allen and suggested that

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<sup>1</sup>Canadian Archives, 1888. page 873.



they carry off Governor Chittenden, Bailey and Major Ebenezer Allen. The rest could be brought over by other means. On the same date he wrote: "The leading men will be bountifully rewarded if they bring back the people of Vermont." The British concluded that they were in a fair way to effect their purpose and December 20th, 1780, Haldimand gave instructions to Justus Sherwood and George Smyth, with full power, to negotiate with the people of Vermont for the exchange of prisoners and authorized them to assure the people of Vermont that they shall have an independent government of their own and elect their own civil officers.<sup>1</sup> The utmost caution was necessary in view of their powerful enemies and the prejudices to be combated. He proposed to raise two battalions, whose officers were to be appointed by Governor Chittenden and the Council of Vermont. Those promoting the reunion were to receive gratuities. He would send three thousand troops to Lake Champlain. The negotiations were to be secret, but the truce could not be privately continued. He agreed that the negotiations should cease and that every step which had led to them be forgotten, in the event of Congress' recognition of Vermont as a state.

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<sup>1</sup> Vermont Historical Collections, II:87-89.



Owing to the early winter and the freezing of the Lake,<sup>1</sup> the commissioners were unable to meet at the appointed time.

During the period when this correspondence was being carried on with Quebec, Governor Chittenden wrote to the governors of New York, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, and made a positive demand that they relinquish all claim of jurisdiction over the State of Vermont, and proposed a union for defense against the British forces.

January 15th, 1781, Governor Chittenden wrote to Washington, expressing their esteem for his services and the loyalty of the Vermont people to the cause. He asked for a sufficient number of prisoners to effect an exchange.

In February, 1789, Beverly Robinson again wrote to Allen, informing him that he had sent two copies of his letter and had received no answer; "but the frequent accounts we have had for the three months past from your country confirms me in the opinion I had of your inclination to join the King's cause."<sup>2</sup>

Ethan Allen sent two of Robinson's letters to the President of Congress, March 9th, saying that they were the only two received from Robinson and no answer had been given.<sup>3</sup> He

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<sup>1</sup>Canadian Archives, 1888, page 781.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 1888, page 781.

Vermont Historical Collections, II:92.

<sup>3</sup>Records of Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, II:407.



made a vigorous plea about the exposed condition of Vermont and claimed the right to agree on a cessation of hostilities with Great Britain if the United States would not accept her applications.<sup>1</sup> While he was loyal to the cause of his country, he was determined to defend the independence of Vermont. He did not tell of the various other letters sent, nor of his own negotiations with other British agents. Chittenden and Allen were using every means to prevail upon Congress to recognize their independence and loyalty and admit them to statehood. Congress was afraid to take vigorous action in political life, at this time as the evnts of the war were not favorable to the American cause, so she adopted the policy of delay in regard to the claim of Vermont.

General Haldimand, April 30th, wrote to Lord Germaine, expressing his suspicion that Ethan Allen was endeavoring to deceive both Congress and themselves and that Germaine had been too sanguine. Vermont would be guided by interest. May 1st, Ira Allen was appointed to settle a cartel and, if possible, to procure an armistice. This must be obtained or the frontier be evacuated. Only a few of the leaders were informed of the whole matter. Ira Allen went to Isle-aux-Noix

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and entered into negotiations with J. Sherwood, lasting from the 8th to the 25th of May. The cartel was arranged with the proper officials and negotiations were taken up between Colonel Sherwood and Ira Allen.<sup>1</sup> The General Assembly had authorized an exchange of prisoners, but the leaders, seeing their opportunity to gain an advantage, had turned it to account. The negotiations, during the month, were reported by Sherwood as follows: Ira Allen informed Sherwood that he had no authority to treat concerning union but simply to lay the matter and situation before General Haldimand and inform him that matters were not ripe for any permanent proposal; the people were not yet prepared for reunion. The leaders were anxious for a neutrality and wished to settle a cartel for the exchange of prisoners and, at the same time, keep the door open for future negotiations. Vermont now included all the territory from Mason's line to the Hudson river. Allen seemed to Sherwood very cautious and intricate. He would not make proposals, but wished to see General Haldimand. He said that the Vermont people would insist upon electing their own governor, and, when they were ripe for proposals, they would not go further than neutrality during the war,

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<sup>1</sup>American MSS. of the Revolution, 169, pages 31 to 50.  
Canadian Archives, 1882. pages 8 to 10.



and a free charter after that. On the 17th, Allen said the leading men were trying to bring about a union by way of neutrality. They had taken in the East and West unions to embarrass Congress and strengthen themselves for a revolution or, at least, to provide for recognition as a neutral power. Allen affirmed that principle inclined him, and Vermont, in general, to wish for the success of America, but interest and self-preservation inclined them to hope for the success of Great Britain. He was anxious to see how the war would turn out. He explained the necessity for sending Robinson's letters to Congress to secure the safety of General Allen, as it was previously known in public that such letters had been sent. On the 21st, Allen was shown a copy of Haldimand's instructions, and was satisfied of the General's power to treat. He said that he would efface, as much as he was able, the idea of a truce, subsisting between Great Britain and Vermont, and assured Sherwood that he and his brother would do all they could to bring about a reunion, if they were only allowed time. On the 23rd, Allen said that very few of the people and only part of the Legislature, and many even did not know that. He was more sanguine and thought that it was to the interest of Vermont to accept the terms offered.

Sherwood told him that he wished he [Allen] had spok-



en with such candor at first as the change gave room for suspicion that he now acted upon design. The following day Allen asserted that he would positively declare to the other states that no truce, nor probability of one, subsisted between General Haldimand and Vermont. He was sorry he was not able to enter into any proposal for a union. He said that he and his family had large fortunes which they did not intend to lose, if there were any possibility of saving them. He thought that definite arrangements could be made to hear from them by July 20th, and they would then be ready to treat.<sup>1</sup> During the conference, Ira Allen gave answers relative to Vermont, her early active participation in the rebellion, their motives now and their reasons for desiring an armistice and its advantages to the British, and what help could be expected.<sup>2</sup> These were written down by Major Lenoult and forwarded to General Haldimand.

Captain Sherwood's letters to his brother officers, during this period, show in what light he considered the negotiations and their purpose.<sup>3</sup> He wrote in one letter of the inherent deceit of Allen and his party and the demand for neutrality; in another he says: "Allen's conduct is equivo-

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<sup>1</sup>Canadian Archives, 1888, pages 851, 852.

<sup>2</sup>Records of Governor and Council of State of Vermont,  
II:415.

<sup>3</sup>Canadian Archives, 1888, page 851.



cal and his negotiations unsatisfactory; I think a good army would soon bring them to terms and would urge vigorous measures." Again, later: "Allen is apparently for reunion, but I doubt his sincerity." "The result of the negotiations with Vermont will depend on the turn of affairs at the Chesapeake."

The commissioners were puzzled with regard to the character of what had taken place. They understood plainly that Vermont was acting from interest and not from loyalty. Allen at first was reserved; then he became candid and open, yet not sanguine. He admitted that many would be decidedly opposed to the proposition, and would ruin those who carried it out, if they could. While the negotiations were being conducted in May, letters were written by many of those acquainted with the facts to various persons in the secret, for divers reasons and purposes. Colonel Robinson informed Haldimand that the leaders expected that the Colonies would fail and so would make no definite arrangements except with the Crown.<sup>1</sup> It would be best for England to let her play a double game until they could assure her of support, as the majority were still opposed to reunion. Time must be given them to prepare the people. The western expansion was a

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<sup>1</sup>Vermont Historical Collections, II:120.



project of Ira Allen's, perhaps to find a counterbalance against the majority, and it is said that he was against the Eastern union. Ira Allen wrote a long letter of information in respect to the state of Vermont, and enclosed the circular letters sent to the neighboring states, with the explanation that they were designed as a political stroke to keep them from committing hostilities when Vermont should declare neutrality. He gave the steps leading to the East and West unions and the benefits to Vermont derived from them. He explained the reasons for sending Robinson's letters to Congress and the action of approval by the Assembly. It was to be hoped that Vermont would be ready to negotiate by the next meeting of the Assembly.

General Haldimand was of the opinion that all this was for the purpose of gaining time and influence with Congress rather than for forwarding the negotiations, and determined to put a stop to all treating with them unless they would do something.<sup>1</sup> He wrote to Ira Allen that he could not accept a treaty of neutrality and regretted the results that might follow from the exposure of the secret. He demanded that a denial should be made publicly in regard to a suspension of

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<sup>1</sup> Vermont Historical Collections, II:125,



arms, and no more flags sent unless the Assembly should come to a decision.

Captain Mathews wrote to Sherwood, May 21st, 1781, that Haldimand wished him to encourage the Vermonters to a reunion.<sup>1</sup> He was to use such overtures as he thought best, but to guard against the duplicity those people possess.

On the same day, Ira Allen wrote to Major Lernoult that the Legislature would meet July 20th, and if it is not a certainty that prisoners will be exchanged it may be very prejudicial to some more important matters. On the next day he urged the same matter and asked for time. He would undeceive the neighboring states in regard to a truce, and the commissioners would be sent as soon as possible. He wrote to Major Dundas that he could not imagine where the idea that he was proposing a truce originated.<sup>2</sup> He would be glad to have proposals from the commissioners. Major Dundas replied that the word truce did not originate from Allen's letter or proposal, and they had no proposals to make. No arrangements could be effected until commissioners were sent with full powers.

June 18th, 1781, the Assembly of Vermont resolved that

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<sup>1</sup>Vermont Historical Collections, II:126.

<sup>2</sup>Canadian Archives, 1888, page 783.



an inquiry be made the following day into the grounds of the report of a treaty with Canada.<sup>1</sup> The Governor and the Council attended on the Assembly and the Governor proceeded to state the facts: that in consequence of applications from several persons, praying that some measures might be taken to procure the exchange of their friends who were prisoners in Canada, in the recess of the Legislature, he had, with the advice of the Council, appointed and authorized Colonel Ira Allen to go to Isle-aux-Noix to settle a cartel for the exchange of prisoners, in behalf of the state. Colonel Allen had, with difficulty, done this and as he was present, he could give any further particulars. Colonel Allen gave a verbal statement of the whole transaction. The motion was put and carried that he produce the papers relative to the affair. The following day Allen produced a few letters relative to the exchange of prisoners; the explanation was accepted and ordered to be printed and to be sent to the other states.

The majority, desirous of admission to the confederation, proposed that commissioners should be sent to Congress. At the same time, a resolution was passed, declaring that

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<sup>1</sup>Allen, Ira, - History of the State of Vermont, pp. 427 and 428.



Vermont should not be called upon to pay any of the expenses of the war. Both measures carried and Ira Allen, Fay, and Woodward were appointed commissioners. Before the Assembly met the leaders gave Ira Allen a certificate of protection, stating where he had been, and why, and that he had used his best policy by feigning or endeavoring to make them believe that the State of Vermont had a desire to negotiate a treaty of peace with Great Britain, thereby to prevent the immediate invasion of the frontiers of this State, - "We think it to be a necessary political manoeuvre to save the frontier of this State." This was signed by eight persons.<sup>1</sup> Another certificate of similar nature was given to Ira Allen,<sup>2</sup> when he wrote to Haldimand, July 30th.<sup>3</sup>

The spectators from Canada reported that General Allen was suspected of soliciting troops with which to ensnare General Haldimand's troops, and that Governor Chittenden would settle with Britain if the leading men were allowed to continue such under Britain,<sup>4</sup> and no damage for confiscated estates.<sup>4</sup> If these were not accepted, it was the business of Vermont to spin out the summer in truces and prepare for de-

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<sup>1</sup>Records of Governor and Council of State of Vermont, II:427.

<sup>2</sup>Hall, Hiland, - Early History of Vermont, p. 366.

<sup>3</sup>Canadian Archives, 1888, page 783.

<sup>4</sup>Vermont Historical Collections, page 135.



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June 16th, 1782, Allen (Ethan?) wrote to Haldimand of a conference that he had held with a British agent and of the state of affairs in Vermont. He said that the refusal of Congress had aroused a bitter resentment, with the common people. Vermont is now a neutral Republic. The frontier towns favor the leaders. "I shall do everything in my power to render this state a British Province." The following month, Ira Allen went to Canada to secure the release of two officers, prisoners there. He wrote to Haldimand, asking in regard to Skene's Charter and urging him to get a copy as it would combine Vermont and the West union and assist in the wished-for revolution which the leaders were very anxious to accomplish.<sup>1</sup> He advised the raising of two regiments supported by the king, from the other provinces and stationing them in Vermont. He urged the immediate recognition of Vermont by a secret treaty, which was to be ratified by Governor Chittenden, General Allen and the Council, declaring Vermont a British province. He had no authority to make the proposition as he was merely an agent sent to negotiate a re-union. Most of the authorities and people were desirous of a reunion and money should be sent to further it. Allen was

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<sup>1</sup>American MSS. of the Revolution, 309 to 317.



certainly playing for time. This was agreeable to Haldimand as he was doing the same thing.<sup>1</sup> He had been ordered by Lord Shelburne to avoid all appearance of insidiousness. He wrote to Governor Chittenden that there would be no hostilities in the Vermont district, unless events compelled it. It was well understood by the British agents that Vermont would be guided by self-interest; they estimated that one-fifth of the population would support the policy of the leaders, and that one-fifth were loyalists, desirous of union with the mother country. The other three-fifths were ardent supporters of Congress and accustomed to dominate over and persecute the loyalists. The question was, how to win them over to Britain. There was some advantage obtainable to Canada by the continuance of the negotiations, even when uncertain of the good faith of those engaged in them.<sup>2</sup> Canada was immune from invasion. Clinton expressed doubts of their sincerity and Lord Germain advised a show of force on the frontier and would allow the Vermont leaders to extend their boundaries.<sup>3</sup>

The question of the New Hampshire grants was to come up before Congress at the next session. Accordingly, delegates from New York and New Hampshire and Vermont were present when Congress convened in August, 1781, and each state set



from New York, New Hampshire, and Vermont were present when Congress convened in August, 1781, and each state set forth its claims.<sup>1</sup> Congress submitted some queries to test, as it were, the feelings of Vermont towards Congress.<sup>2</sup> In reply, Vermont agreed to contribute to the war such expenses as were judged equitable. With regard to the grants of land to private individuals, they were prepared to be guided by circumstances, without adhering to strict rules of law. On being asked what attempts, public and private, had been made by the enemies of Congress to draw off the affections of Vermont, they replied that the only public documents were the letters of Beverly Robinson. They were unable to vouch in the matter of private correspondence.

The state could furnish seven thousand militia and sufficient provisions for twelve months.

Congress then passed resolutions that Vermont must withdraw to her original territory before she would be recognized as a State.<sup>3</sup>

Congress was influenced to take some action on account of an intercepted letter, published August 4th, giving the

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<sup>1</sup>Records of the Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, II:312-319.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., page 319.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., page 320.



plans of the British in relation to the Vermont people if Washington should attempt an invasion of Canada.

The resolutions of Congress were sent to Governor Chittenden, with a verbal message from Washington, by Captain Heacock. The object was to learn whether the people of Vermont would be satisfied with the independence suggested, or whether they seriously contemplated joining the enemy. Governor Chittenden replied that the purpose of the negotiations was to secure protection, the people were for the United States and desired admission but would join the British rather than be forced to submit to New York.

In August, the British agents met Major Fay to carry on the negotiations. They wrote to Haldimand that Ira Allen's letter had been carefully read and that it had not the appearance of the undisguised sentiments of an honest heart.<sup>1</sup> They had found Fay as unprepared to treat as was Ira Allen. He appeared candid and assured them they were bringing on the resolutions as fast as possible. He was willing to forward to the British all papers, instructions of agents, of Congress, and doings of the Assembly, and regretted that he could not close with the British terms. Fay was described

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<sup>1</sup>American MSS. Number 18, page 26.



as honest or a perfect Jesuit, "We have too much reason to fear the latter." Fay asks that the negotiations be continued until November; "they are spinning out the Summer and Autumn,- truces, cartels, and negotiations, by the expiration of which they hope to hear of the move for treaty in Vienna." Our fears are strengthened when we consider that the majority of these leaders were men of low character and of no consequence before the Rebellion.

August 2nd, General Haldimand wrote to Sir Henry Clinton of Vermont's actions in strengthening her forces and suggested that Ira Allen's letter was fraught with duplicity.<sup>1</sup>

Major Fay wrote to Haldimand, assuring him of good intentions, and expressing the hope that a change of governments would be effected in October.<sup>2</sup> On August 16th, Haldimand answered, expressing his disappointment that Fay did not have more powers.<sup>3</sup> He had been assured that the present flag would bring matters to an end. He is sorry that the Vermont leaders have not acted promptly. He himself would have preferred a proclamation to express his views, rather than secrecy. The system of procrastination prevails, and important letters are left behind. He had avoided hostili-

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<sup>1</sup>American MSS., Number 19.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., Number 19.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., Number 20.



ties on the faith of Allen's and Fay's professions, but no more flags of truce will be allowed, unless to signify acceptance of his offers.

While these negotiations were being carried on in secret, the actions of the Vermont leaders caused considerable anxiety to the other States. As early as January 21st, 1781, Chief Justice Smith wrote to William Eden: "I believe," says Rochambeau, "that there are Arnolds on every side, -<sup>1</sup> is it to be wondered at when, from fear or affection, no force can be persuaded to move against Allen or Vermont."

Governor Clinton wrote to Mr. Schuyler of his belief in the disloyalty of the Vermont leaders, but a few days later, General Allen wrote to Schuyler, informing him of a plot to capture him, and assured him that the late reports of his correspondence with the enemy to the prejudice of the United States were wholly without foundation. Schuyler sent it to Washington, expressing doubts of Allen's sincerity and enclosed the letter of a pretended deserter, Smith, incriminating Allen.

Washington ordered Schuyler to arrest him, if there were good grounds for suspicion, but he believed the bulk of

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<sup>1</sup>American MSS., Number 747.



the people were well affected. The Vermont leaders had openly said that they would kame a truce with Great Britain, if Congress did not grant them admission.<sup>1</sup>

In accordance with previous arrangements, Sherwood and Smyth met Ira Allen and Fay at Skenesboro to exchange prisoners, deliver letters, and, as they supposed, come to a definite arrangement for such promises had been insinuated, if not actually given, by Allen and Fay.<sup>2</sup> They were informed that Congress would reject the proposals made by Vermont, and that the new Legislature of Vermont consisted mostly of members personally unknown to each other; same time must be allowed before an appeal for a change of government could be made to it.

The plan of government for Vermont as a British Colony was discussed, and it was agreed that it should be essentially the same as that established by the constitution and similar to that of the Colony of Connecticut, except that the King in Council should appoint the Governor. The British Commissioner suggested the capture of the Vermonters who were most violently opposed to the negotiations, but this was rejected. They then insisted that Vermont should de-

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<sup>1</sup>Washington's Life and Letters, VII:283.

<sup>2</sup>Records of the Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, II:440.



clare itself a British Colony at once. The Vermont agents stated the objections to this: The locality of Vermont, adjoining thick settlements of the United States; The staunch Whigs among the body of the people; Ties of relationship with other states, and the difficulty with which Britain could defend them in the winter; They urged that time, during an armistice, was necessary to prepare the people for any change. The British Commissioners took down in writing the heads of these objections, and "then suggested an instruction, which they were not at liberty to deviate from without putting an end to the armistice, <sup>1</sup> which was, that His Excellency, General Haldimand should, in pursuance of full powers vested in him by His Majesty in Council, issue a proclamation offering to confirm Vermont as a colony under the Crown."

The Vermont agents, according to Allen, protested vigorously, at first, against this and were "unpleasantly situated," but consented to have the proclamations brought up the lake rather than break the armistice. They proposed that the "Proclamation should contain the terms the Court of Great Britain have authorized His Excellency to give Vermont." "That there should be no undue advantage taken of

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<sup>1</sup>Records of the Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, II:441, 445.



such Proclamation; we propose that it be lodged with the General Commissioners on the Lake;" that as soon as the Legislature had rejected the proposal of Congress to limit the territory of Vermont, a confidential messenger would be sent with the intelligence and the proclamation with a flag then be sent to the Governor, and submitted to the Assembly. <sup>1</sup> When the proposal was made that a proclamation should be issued, General Haldimand submitted certain questions which Fay and Allen answered. They thought the proclamation would add numbers to the object.

General Haldimand drew up the proclamation<sup>2</sup> and sent it to General Clinton<sup>3</sup> for advice. It contained the plan of government as outlined above, with the addition of free trade with Canada. He thought the actions of the leaders obscure and mysterious and had unfavorable suspicions. He planned to have a strong force at Crown Point when the Assembly met.<sup>4</sup>

On October 27th, General Haldimand was informed by his agents that it was not best to issue the proclamation yet, and enclosing a letter from Allen,<sup>5</sup> saying that the Southern

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<sup>1</sup>Canadian Archives, 1888, page 787; 1885, page 341.

<sup>2</sup>Record of the Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, II:447.

<sup>3</sup>American MSS., pages 206 to 213.

<sup>4</sup>Canadian Archives, 1885, page 341.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., 1888, page 787.

Records of Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, II:451.



Campaign was having considerable influence and urged delay. Final success, however, was assured.

The Legislature of Vermont met October 16th, and it was resolved that the Legislature could not comply with the resolutions of Congress without destroying the whole foundation of the present universal harmony and agreement that subsists in the State and a violation of solemn compact entered into by articles of union and confederation; that the resolutions of Congress of the 7th and 20th of August "precluded any propositions made by the agents on the 15th of August, and that it ought not to be considered binding."<sup>1</sup> It was recommended that Vermont should remain firm to the principles on which the government had been assumed. A resolution was passed to send to Congress an extract from the articles of union, which enforced that no member should submit to arbitration the independence of Vermont. They were willing to consider the question of boundary.

Some of the members newly elected were more favorable to Congress than those defeated, so the leaders claimed. Those prominent in the movement were reported to be gloomy over the prospect. On all sides it was seen that at this

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<sup>1</sup>Records of the Governor and the Council of the State of Vermont, II:321.



crisis it was undesirable to issue the proclamation. Haldimand expressed his belief in the good faith of the leaders, and occupied Crown Point with one thousand men, and other operations were begun to carry weight and influence. The capitulation of Cornwallis destroyed all hopes of any successful result. The proclamation was never issued.

Many letters were exchanged among the British relative to the situation in Vermont, from September to January, 1782, holding out hopes for a reunion, but all were doubtful when the result of the Southern campaign was made known.<sup>1</sup>

In consequence of the favorable news from Yorktown, New York became more self asserting and in December a special meeting of the Assembly was called at Poughkeepsie. February 28th, 1784, Governor Clinton laid before the Legislature what are described as "affidavits and papers which prove a dangerous intercourse and connection between the leaders of the revolt in the north-eastern part of the state (so Vermont was styled) and the common enemy." The matter was referred to a Committee which reported that Vermont had negotiated a treaty, that troops were to be raised for the King and that the disaffected were emigrating to the territory.

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<sup>1</sup>Canadian Archives, 1888, page 786; 1887, page 552; 1885, pages 341 to 344, 361.



It was resolved that New York enforce its authority and that the papers should be forwarded to Congress.

The affidavits were those of John Edgar<sup>1</sup> and David Abeel two escaped prisoners, and with the letter contained the substance of the secret negotiations.

T. Jones, in his History of New York, Volume II, says that the letter was given to Governor Clinton by Chief Justice Smith, an old friend, to whom it had been given by Sir Henry Clinton for his opinion; this, however, is not true.<sup>2</sup>

Madison, in several letters, expressed his apprehensions over the Vermont subject. Congress took up the matter, February 19th, 1782, and gave the ultimatum to Vermont: to accept her terms or force would be used. The Vermont Assembly voted to relinquish the claim to the territory without her boundary line, before they heard of these resolutions. This was disapproved by Ira Allen and Fay, the agents to Congress, because it would weaken Vermont and they did not believe Congress would admit them anyway. Governor Chittenden had written to Washington in the fall of 1781, and Washington replied January 1st, 1782,<sup>3</sup> urging Vermont to withdraw

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<sup>1</sup>Records of the Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, II:464.

<sup>2</sup>Kingsford, William, - History of Canada, VII:103.

<sup>3</sup>Ford, W. C., - Writings of Washington, XIV:424.



her claims and assuring her that Congress would confirm Vermont as a State. He took it for granted that there was no serious intention on the part of the Vermont negotiations, but pointed out their dangerous influence. This had not been done and March 16th, 1782, Chittenden informed Washington of their action and hoped for a speedy admission. The people of Vermont were of one sentiment in the common cause. "The glory of America is our glory, and with our country we mean to live or die, as fate shall be."

Madison thought, April 2nd, that Vermont would now be admitted, but the recommendation of the Committee, April 17th, was not acted upon as the pulse of nine states did not beat favorably to it.<sup>1</sup> Success in the war made the states and Congress more independent and aggressive in their actions toward the Vermont question, and, as a result, the Vermont leaders were forced again to try their former tactics. Promises of a speedy settlement, failure of the Southern Campaign, and winter combined to put an end to the negotiations. Both parties were, therefore, anxious, early in the Spring, to resume correspondence, and, in March, 1782, shortly after the demands of Congress, letters were ex-

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<sup>1</sup>Madison State Papers, I:121, 470.

<sup>2</sup>Rives, W. C.,— History of the Life and Times of Madison, I:473, 477.



changed.<sup>1</sup> Haldimand was convinced that there was some desire for reconciliation; however, the probability of its being brought to pass had been weakened; and as he had received instructions to spare no expense, he still retained a strong detachment at Crown Point.

Early in the summer of 1782, Haldimond received orders from Carleton at New York to act only on the defensive; instructions attributable to the beginning of peace negotiations.<sup>2</sup> April 28th, he informed Sir Henry Clinton that the differences in their instructions in regard to Vermont made it difficult to act. He favored coercion. He was much concerned over the substance of the negotiations being printed in a newspaper, as it proves that confidence has been betrayed. In another letter, in May, he expresses his belief in their sincerity, as they report a gain in influence.<sup>3</sup> In July, Haldimand describes his embarrassment to Clinton. The change in the home administration suggested that he could not continue to act towards Vermont as he had done until he received instructions as to the course he should pursue. He was detaining the messenger, and keeping the Ver-

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<sup>1</sup>Canadian Archives, 1887, page 556.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., page 557.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., page 559.



mont people in a favorable spirit. In the event of an attack upon Canada their alliance would be of importance. Another messenger reports that all but two of the members of the Council are friendly, the others will do all in their power to reunite with Canada. August 11th, he writes of the proposals of Vermont to join, provided they are not exposed to the rage of the other Colonies.<sup>1</sup> Under cover of suspension of hostilities, thousands, the people think, would flock to their country. August 28th, he shows much anxiety respecting Vermont;<sup>2</sup> and, July 28th,<sup>3</sup> says that, since Washington's tour, all friends of the Government (British) have been compelled to take the oath of allegiance or to abandon their settlements. The people are overawed by Washington.<sup>4</sup> In September, he proposes plans for free trade with Vermont.

He continued to exchange prisoners with Vermont, and proposed a large sum of money to be used there.<sup>5</sup> While these letters show his embarrassment and his doubts, the British Commissioners were doing what they could to bring about a reunion. A letter was sent by him to the Vermont Commissioners in April, giving the same terms that General

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<sup>1</sup>Canadian Archives, 1887, page 560.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 1887, page 560.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 1887, pages 532, 533.

<sup>4</sup>Records of the Governor and Council of the State of Vermont, II:475 to 477.



Haldimand had offered previously; if they were still in the notion of negotiating, they must relate all that had been transacted in the Council relative to the affair. April 30th, a second letter informed them that Haldimand had received full powers<sup>1</sup> from the King to establish the Vermont government, including the unions and all privileges offered before and other inducements.

The negotiations going on between the Colonies and Great Britain for peace, and winter coming on again, put an end to Vermont transactions with the British.

Congress had not admitted Vermont for many reasons, given by Madison, so March 23rd, 1783, General Haldimand wrote to Vermont, expressing his sincere desire to serve them in the future, as he had done in the past, if favorable opportunities should present of reuniting them to the mother country.

Thus terminated a correspondence on the subject of reunion, carried on for several years and giving rise to much uneasiness and various conjectures.

The objects of the British were to reunite Vermont to England and obtain immunity from invasion.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Kingsford, William, - History of Canada, VII:95.



The Vermont historians say emphatically that on the part of the Vermont leaders they were carried on to stop hostilities, which they accomplished by evasive, ambiguous, general answers, proposals, and delays.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>See Slade, Williams, Thompson, B. H. Hall and H. Hall.



## CONCLUSIONS

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I do not believe that the leaders of Vermont ever seriously considered reuniting with Canada. They were between two difficulties and likely to be destroyed by one or the other.

The leaders were nearly all large land holders and would lose their titles if compelled to submit to New York. A great many of the people were in the same condition, and they were willing to support their leaders in any action that would overthrow New York's supremacy.

The Vermont people as a whole, and their leaders in particular, had taken an active part in the Revolutionary war and by their timely participation had captured several valuable forts, were of great assistance in defeating Burgoyne, and were the first to confiscate Tory property in order to obtain funds to carry on the war.

By all these acts they had made themselves especially open to an attack from the British, for their province must be the door by which the army from Canada could enter. At



least no army could pass down through New York without a strong guard on the flank or an actual invasion of Vermont territory.

The Vermont leaders were as active and determined against the British as any others, until they saw that Congress would not admit them on account of the influence of New York and Governor Clinton in particular and other leaders and states in general, mostly for selfish reasons.

Congress was unable to protect their frontiers on account of a lack of means and men. This meant the depreciation of their land values and the destruction of their improvements and perhaps total loss, if the British should prevail in that quarter.

It was equally as important to the British if they could come to a cessation of hostilities with the Vermont people. It meant the weakening of the enemy and required a smaller army, in case of an advance into the states, to guard the base of operations. This alone would repay them even if they could not win them back to reunion.

Thus we have conditions such that both sides can secure advantages, and indulge in diplomatic negotiations to the mutual satisfaction of each.

The Vermont leaders took advantage of the opportunity offered by the British, to protect their frontiers, preserve



their estates, which Ira Allen asked Sherwood to do and orders were issued accordingly, and at the same time influence Congress, which Madison says it did.

They at no time aided the British and invariably put them off by delays, excuses, and lack of power to negotiate, and frequently informed the British that negotiations would cease if they were admitted by Congress.

They quickly complied with the requests of Congress, in nearly every instance, in order to gain their admission which they were ever active in seeking until the war was over.

They ever avowed to the British the principle of loyalty to the American cause, but that interest forced them to treat for a cessation of hostilities. They were insistent on an armistice only, and it was when they could not get this any longer that they accepted the ruse of deceit, in regard to reunion. It was certainly a ruse, for they were never ready to carry to completion any project leaning towards reunion.

Excuses, delays, lack of authority, neglect to bring valuable papers, promises, deceit, or Skene's charter were their stock in trade and all used for the one purpose, self-interest.

They never made any efforts to convert the people to the British cause and, being few in number, they would have courted certain destruction by openly favoring reunion. They



had difficulty in avoiding censure and condemnation on several occasions, when there were almost insurrections to demand explanations.

After the war was over they made no effort to join Canada, but kept up this pretended friendship after peace was declared, in order to gain trading advantages or acquire property.

And a few years later even, a Canadian historian accuses them of preparing to invade Canada on two different occasions. They were only trying to carry out the theories of the revolutionary leaders, as Adams and Jefferson, respecting the political rights of settlers in vacant regions, that they should make such laws and regulations as would most likely promote public happiness.<sup>1</sup>

Being unable to do this in one way they adopted another and success at last crowned their efforts.

OPINIONS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS:- Lossing, in his life of General Schuyler, page 409, says: "The shrewd diplomats of Vermont were working for a twofold object, namely, to keep back the British and to induce Congress to admit the independence of their domain as a state of the union."

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p. 267. <sup>1</sup>Turner, F. J., American Historical Review, 1895-96,



Dunlap in his History of New York, volume I, page 219 says: "Under pretense of a negotiation for exchange of prisoners, commissioners were sent to meet the British agents, who proposed terms of the most tempting nature to Vermont, if she joined the royal cause. These commissioners managed to dupe the English, left them in the opinion that they were in a fair way to effect their purpose, and the British forces returned to their winter quarters, leaving the frontiers unmolested."

Jared Sparks<sup>1</sup> is one of the best authorities of the whole transaction, and sums up the matter: "That in the allowable strategems of war they (the leaders) bethought themselves to turn to a profitable purpose this advance on the part of the enemy."

Mr. W. L. Stone in his life of Joseph Brant, volume II, page 203, agrees with Mr. Sparks in the opinion that "there was never any serious intention on the part of the Vermontese to listen to the British proposals. But with great deference, after a full examination of the case, the same cannot be said of the leaders of the Vermontese, they had determined

<sup>1</sup>Sparks, Jared, American Biographies, V, I: p. 338-349.



that New York should be dismembered, and if they could not force themselves into the confederation as a state, they were willing to fall back to the arms of Great Britain as a colony.

But it is certain from the conduct of the people of the Grants when they heard of St. Leger's regret at the killing of the sergeant that they were prepared for no such arrangement."

R. R. Livingston wrote to Benjamin Franklin,<sup>1</sup> February 1782, in regard to the Vermont agitation: "The facility with which the British deceive themselves, and the address with which they deceive others may render it a matter of moment in Europe, though in fact it is none in America. The bulk of the people of that country are "New England Presbyterian Whigs". Some of those in the possession of the powers of government have more address than principle. Finding themselves exposed to inroads from Canada, they have tampered with that government and pretended to be willing to form a treaty of neutrality with them during the war, and to return to the obedience of Britain in peace.

Daniel Chapman in his answer to Mr. Stone says: "The

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<sup>1</sup>Franklin, Benjamin, Writings, - V.IX: p. 162.



British authorities in Canada proposed to the leading men in Vermont a cessation of hostilities with a view to a negotiation by which Vermont should be detached from the United States and become a British province. The leaders felt themselves at liberty to accept the proposal for an armistice, and played the game adroitly and successfully. Thus the British undertaking to tamper with the patriotic sons of the Green Mountains found their match and were so completely duped and deceived, that their enemies alone were benefited by the armistice."<sup>1</sup>

Winsor says: "Negotiations in fact conducted in bad faith. It may be that such expressions were more used for coercing Congress than for turning the British, though they doubtless had the latter effect, the more definite expressions of their traitorous - if they be so called- views we get from British records."

At the same time it is impossible to resist the impression that the leaders were acting with good faith, and were desirous of becoming independent of Congress, and that

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<sup>1</sup>Vermont Historical Collection, V,II: p. 387.

<sup>2</sup>Winsor, Justin, *Narrative and Critical History*, V,VII: p. 188.



Vermont should become a part of British America. I cannot myself doubt, that there was really a disposition on the part of the leading men to sever the fortunes of the new state from those of Congress, more especially as the geographical position of Vermont at that time, before the days of canals and railways, made her dependent on the St. Lawrence. The outlet by which her produce could be exported was upon Canada, as furnishing the best means of reaching the ocean. There was a feeling that they were denied justice."<sup>1</sup>

"Had Cornwallis not allowed himself to be shut up in Yorktown, the known facts establish that Vermont would have seceded from Congress and become a portion of British America. It cannot for a moment be pretended that the desire to unite with Canada had its origin in sympathy with her institutions, or from any reawakening of a feeling of loyalty. The truth remains that a large proportion of the inhabitants of Vermont were prepared to return once more under the folds of the British flag with their rights guaranteed and then as a distinct political body recognized."

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<sup>1</sup>Kingsford, William, History of Canada, V, VII: p. 89-108.



Madison says: "Invidious overtures were made to the inhabitants of the district which some of their leaders it was believed were disposed to incline too favorable an ear to. They had much influence in Congress to admit Vermont."<sup>1</sup>

"It would have involved a domestic quarrel which would have compelled that hardy and numerous body of men to throw themselves into the arms of the power with which we were then contending."<sup>2</sup>

He says: "That the visits of Fay and Allen and then the killing of the Vermonters by a detachment of St. Leger's men, with the burial and sending home of the clothes, and prisoners. . . . and free intercourse subsisting between Vermont and Canada from that period. This is proof, a pretty decided one, to show that a connection was formed during the war. If this connection ever existed, what reason have we to believe it has been since dissolved."

Mr. Fernald in Pennsylvania Magazine of History, July 1887. page 165, says: The negotiations for a commercial treaty carried on by Levi Allen, 1791 and his acceptance of

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<sup>1</sup>Rives, William C., History of the Times and Life of Madison, p. 470.

<sup>2</sup>Hamilton, Alexander, Works, V, VII:p. 6.



one hundred pounds as compensation for his losses as a loyalist, which he claimed to have uniformly been, is sufficient proof of disloyalty.<sup>1</sup>

But read in answer, Levi Allen's letter to Governor Simcoe carefully, and the statement in Governor and Council of Vermont, Volume I, page 112-13, that he was repudiated as a tory by his brothers. See also Ethan Allen's letter in Slades State Papers, Appendix, where he in 1779 openly accuses him of being a tory and urges that his property be confiscated.

Later communications between the Vermont leaders and the British may help to throw some light on the subject.

March 14, 1783, Sherwood informed Smyth that Marsh and Ebenezer Allen had arrived. "He treated me badly and I cannot treat him civilly. He now pretends to be much attached to the King's government and says the Vermonters are the same, and expect General Allen to be their Governor under the King. I believe their object is to trade and shall send them back on a pretext."

Ira Allen tells Sherwood and Smyth the twenty-fourth,

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<sup>1</sup>Canadian Archives, 1889, p. 53-58.

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that the proprietors of land which he wishes to get, will sell and asks for a loan of money at 6% and will present each with a good farm when times gets good. Sherwood asks that the correspondence be kept up. He informed Mathews, April tenth, that Ira Allen represented Vermont as preferring peace with Great Britain. April twenty-seventh, he wrote: "General Allen wants loyalists to settle on the border so there will soon be sufficient to revolt and unite. He asked that the property in the buildings in the post be given to him."<sup>1</sup>

Major Luterloh <sup>2</sup> wrote to Fay, April 11, 1783, that he was sending the officers carrying the terms of peace through Vermont and advises them to purchase the fleet on the lakes as they were not necessary to Great Britain.

May twenty-ninth, Ira Allen proposed to Haldimand, a contract for supplying the troops in Canada with provisions. May thirtieth, Ethan Allen wrote to the same recommending Fay and Ira Allen as proper persons to procure and deliver beef for the troops.

Sherwood and Smyth replied to Allen that Haldimand would not admit of trade which would militate against Allen's in-

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<sup>1</sup>Canadian Archives, 1888, p. 835.

<sup>2</sup>Canadian Archives, 1888, p. 790-794.



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June 21st, Smyth informed Ethan Allen that the reason why Haldimand did not accept his proposal at once was that they had plenty. It was his intention to give his friends there every indulgence in his power.<sup>1</sup>

July 7th, Ira Allen wrote: "Fay has bought a drove of fat cattle and sheep and will soon be at Crown Point on the way to the Province. I suppose that approbation will not be given to others to bring beef into the Province.

September 5th, Fay wrote to Mathews, cattle of Allen and himself disposed of. Thanks Haldimand for the favor.<sup>2</sup>

July 12th, 1784, Chittenden proposed to Haldimand that free trade be carried on between Vermont and Canada.<sup>3</sup>

September 10th, 1784, Ira Allen wrote to Haldimand: "The people of Vermont are waiting for free trade with Canada; they consider themselves unconnected with any power and by natural situation inclined to that province for commerce.

September 17th, Haldimand answered: "Cannot open free trade with Vermont, but would permit Vermont to send in cat-

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<sup>1</sup>Canadian Archives, 1888. page 790.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., page 791.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., page 794.



tle and grain and to receive clothing and necessaries of life. Allen and his brothers may send in cattle for the choice market.

In September, Allen asks to drive some cattle to the Province in the fall.

In April, 1785, Ira Allen was commissioned by Vermont to obtain free trade with Canada.<sup>1</sup>

In August, 1794, Governor Simcoe wrote to Mr. Dundas in regard to Vermont and the rumors in New York newspapers alleging that the people of Vermont were disposed to commence hostilities with Canada; these he declared fabrications.<sup>2</sup>

He regrets the disputes, over lands, between the two states, and encloses a letter from Mr. Jarvis of Canada.

He had conversed with Governor Chittenden and found him opposed to the action of the United States government in taking sides with France against England.

Chittenden affirmed that he and the Council were of the same opinion that they were in 1781, when Fay was negotiating a union. Colonel Ira Allen affirmed the same.

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<sup>1</sup>Canadian Archives, 1888, page 794.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 1889, page 57.



1796. The evidence concerning the invasion of Canada suggests that it would have been to a great extent composed of men from Vermont, well equipped with artillery, arms, and ammunition.<sup>1</sup>

January, 1797. The ship, Olive Branch was captured with twenty thousand stands of arms and Ira Allen of Vermont. He explained that they were for the militia of Vermont, but had no documents.

Ira Allen attempts to refute this in his book "Olive Branch."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Kingsford, William,- History of Canada, VII:444.



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